THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF BAYESIAN PERSUASION

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SMYE

Motivation

Information does not come for free (Simon '96).

Information provider (Sender) faces a heterogeneous audience.

I study the persuasion of an **inattentive** Receiver who is **privately informed** about her cost and benefit of information.

Example

A persuader wants citizens to stay home during a pandemic, and controls the media.

Additional information has two effects:

- 1. On stay-at-home decisions if people are attentive. Do citizens change their behavior if they watch the media?
- 2. On attention decisions. Do citizens watch the media?

Questions: Who accesses information? What's the persuader-optimal information structure?

Example 2

A seller designs a signal S of the product's quality θ to persuade a buyer to buy.

Increasing the correlation between S and θ has two effects:

- 1. On the buyer's decision to buy if she observes the realization of S (intensive margin of persuasion).
- 2. On the buyer's **attention** (**extensive margin** of persuasion).

Results:

- 1. Characterization of the extensive margin.
- 2. Signals are equivalent to persuasion mechanisms.
- 3. Optimal signal in applications.

Model

Receiver's payoff from **action** $a \in \{0, 1\}$ and **state** $\in [0, 1]$ is

$$U_R(a, \theta, e; c, \lambda) = \underbrace{a(\theta - c)}_{\text{material payoff } u_R} - \underbrace{\lambda k(e)}_{\text{effort cost}},$$

in which:

- $c \in [0, 1]$ is the threshold for action.
- $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ is the attention cost.
- $e \in [0, 1]$ is the attention effort, and k is strictly convex (this talk).
- $\theta \sim \text{abs. cont. CDF } F_0$, with mean x_0 .

Sender's payoff is $U_S(a) = a$.

Receiver is privately informed about her **type**: $(c, \lambda) \in T$, drawn from CDF H and independent of θ .

Timing

- 1. Sender publicly commits to a signal $\sigma \colon \Theta \to \Delta M$ $(M = [0, 1], meas. \sigma)$.
- 2. Receiver chooses an **effort** e, knowing her **type**.

3.1 Nature draws the state θ from F_0 ;

- 3.2 Nature draws a message m from $\sigma(\theta)$.
- 4. With probability e, Receiver observes the message m; and then chooses action a.

Optimal Action given belief μ , of type- (c, λ) Receiver, is:

$$a^{\star} = \mathbf{1}\{\mathbb{E}_{\mu}\theta \geq \mathbf{c}\}.$$

Marginal Benefit of Effort given belief distribution p, of type- (c, λ) Receiver, is:

$$A(c) = \mathbb{E}_p \left[\mathbb{E}_\mu u_R(a^*, c, \theta) \right] - u_R(\mathbf{1}\{x_0 \ge c\}, c, x_0).$$

Literature

Persuasion of privately informed Receiver, with costless access to signal. (Rayo-Segal '10; Kolotilin *et al.* '17; Kolotilin '18; Guo-Shmaya '19; ...)

Persuasion of inattentive Receiver, without private information. (Bizzotto *et al.* '20; Wei '21; Matyskova-Montes '23.)

- Bloedel-Segal wp:

main specification: costly mutual information. alternative: costly attention effort $e \rightarrow$ binary signals.

Attention management: $U_S = u_R$. (Lipnowski *et al.* '20, '22.)

Incomplete-Information beauty contests (Myatt-Wallace '14; Chahrour '14; Galperti-Trevino '20.)

Signals as Information Policies

We identify a signal with its induced **information policy**.


The information policy of CDF F is:

$$I_F(x) = \int_0^x F(\widetilde{x}) \,\mathrm{d}\widetilde{x}, \quad x \ge 0.$$

 F_0 is posterior mean's CDF induced by a fully informative signal.

Every signal induces an information policy of the CDF of the posterior mean. Fact 1 (Gentzkow-Kamenica '16; Kolotilin '18). If $I: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ satisfies 1. and 2., then: I is the information policy of the CDF of the posterior mean for some signal.

Information Policies



Blackwell's ranking of information policies $I \ge J$ iff I is more Blackwell informative than J.


Interval Structure of the Extensive Margin

"Net informativeness" is denoted by

$$\Delta I = I - I_{\overline{F}}.$$

Lemma 1 (Marginal Benefit of Effort) The marginal benefit of effort given information policy *I* satisfies:

$$A(c) = \Delta I(c), \quad \text{for all } c \in [0,1].$$




Extensive Margin

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Linear Cost $(k(e) = \kappa e)$ There exist *cutoff types*, given attention-cost λ : $\underline{c}^{\lambda}(I), \ \overline{c}^{\lambda}(I).$

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Supermodularity

Receiver's value of information policy I is her interim payoff, given her type:

$$V_R(\Delta I(c), \lambda) := \max_{\boldsymbol{e} \in [0,1]} \boldsymbol{e} \Delta I(c) - \lambda k(\boldsymbol{e}).$$

A persuasion mechanism is a menu of information policies: $I_{\bullet} = (I_r)_{r \in T}.$

A persuasion mechanism I_{\bullet} is incentive compatible (IC) if:

 $V_R(\Delta I_{(c,\lambda)}(c),\lambda) \ge V_R(\Delta I_{\widetilde{(c,\lambda)}}(c),\lambda)$ for all types $(c,\lambda) \in T$ and reports $\widetilde{(c,\lambda)} \in T$.

Equivalence

An IC persuasion mechanism I_{\bullet} and an information policy J induce the same effort distribution if:

$$\underset{e \in [0,1]}{\arg \max e \Delta J(c) - \lambda k(e)} = \underset{e \in [0,1]}{\arg \max e \Delta I_{(c,\lambda)}(c) - \lambda k(e)},$$
 for all types (c, λ) .

An IC persuasion mechanism I_{\bullet} and an information policy J induce the same action distribution if:

$$\underbrace{1 - J'(c^{-})}_{\text{Prob. of } \{a^{\star} = 1\}} = 1 - I'_{(c,\lambda)}(c^{-}),$$


for all types (c, λ) who exert positive effort under I_{\bullet} .

Theorem 1

For every IC persuasion mechanism I_{\bullet} there exists an information policy J that induces the same effort and action distributions.

Equivalence

Key step: The upper envelope of the information policies in I_{\bullet} is an information policy.



If $\lambda = 0$ is known to Sender: Kolotilin *et al.* '17.

Sender's Maximization

The Sender's expected payoff from information policy I, if Receiver's cost k is linear, is:

$$V_S(I) = \int_T \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\underline{c}^{\lambda}(I) \le c \le \overline{c}^{\lambda}(I)\}}_{\text{Extensive margin}} \underbrace{\left[\mathbf{1} - I'(c^-) - \mathbf{1}\{x_0 \ge c\}\right]}_{\text{Intensive margin}} \mathrm{d}H(c, \lambda).$$

I is an optimal information policy if it solves the Sender's problem:

$$\sup_{I: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+} V_S(I)$$

subject to:

- 1. I is convex.
- 2. $I_{\overline{F}} \leq I \leq I_{F_0}$.


Single-Peakedness

Assumption (SPness)

- 1. Attention cost λ is independent of threshold c.
- 2. Threshold c admits an abs. cont. PDF f that is single-peaked, with CDF F.

With costless info (k = 0):

- Expected payoff at posterior mean x is CDF of c evaluated at x: F(x).
- ► I' second-order stoch. dominates J' iff: $I \ge J$.



Optimal Signal



Theorem 2

Under the SPness assumption, there exists an optimal information policy that is induced by an upper censorship signal.

Key step Sender's value functional:

 $V_S(I) = \int_{\lambda=0}^1 \int_{c=0}^1 V_R(\Delta I(c), \lambda) h'_c(c) \, \mathrm{d}c h_\lambda(\lambda) \, \mathrm{d}\lambda.$

Application

- 1. Sender knows Receiver's attention $\cot \lambda$.
- 2. k is linear.
- 3. Sender's payoff is:

 $U_S(a, \mathbf{e}) = \psi a + \gamma \mathbf{e}.$

Lemma 2 (Media Censorship)

Interpretation:

- $\psi \ge 0$ is the mobilizing character of the government.

Under 1., 2. and 3., and SPness, there exists an optimal information policy that is induced by a bi-upper censorship signal.



- ▶ Kolotilin *et al.* '22: no media market.
- Gehlbach-Sonin '14: Sender knows c, and does not know λ .

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